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After the U.S. Supreme Court decided the 2003 University of Michigan 
affirmative action cases, the law concerning the use of race-based 
affirmative action programs in the college admissions process seemed to 
be settled for the next few decades.  However, in 2007, the Supreme Court 
once again revisited the use of race-based affirmative action, this time at 
the K–12 level, and subtly, yet significantly, altered how the law will treat 
challenges to affirmative action programs in higher education.  The 
purpose of this Note is to examine the likely impact the holding of this 2007 
U.S. Supreme Court case, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, will have on both the current case law 
surrounding the use of race-based affirmative action policies in the college 
admissions process and the development and implementation of future 
institutional affirmative action policies.  In addition, this Note explores the 
public policy effect resulting from restrictions on the freedom of 
institutions to create their own admissions policies.   
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THE ROLE OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN THE                                            
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROCESS 
MICHAEL P. POHORYLO* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the United States Supreme Court decided the 2003 University of 
Michigan affirmative action cases,1 college administrators rejoiced in what 
many saw as a victory over the opponents of race-based affirmative action 
policies in the college admissions process.2  While these decisions did not 
go so far as to ensure that the use of race-based affirmative action policies 
would be a valid practice forever,3 administrators knew that for the 
foreseeable future they could consider the race of an applicant during the 
admissions process.  Specifically, in affirming the precedent set in Regents 
of the University of California v. Bakke,4 the Supreme Court held that 
achieving a diverse student body within the realm of higher education was 
a compelling government interest, and, as a result, race-based affirmative 
action policies could withstand strict scrutiny if they were narrowly 
tailored.5  Although these policies had to be narrowly tailored to survive 
judicial review, colleges and universities were still provided with sufficient 
autonomy to adopt admissions standards that were consistent with their 
educational mission and the needs of their communities. 
By 2006, however, this period of celebration had already come to an 
abrupt end when the U.S. Supreme Court decided that it would address the 
issue of whether race could be used as a factor in assigning K–12 students 
                                                                                                                          
* Amherst College, B.A. 2004; Boston College, M.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of 
Law, J.D. Candidate 2010.  I would like to thank Dean and Professor Darcy Kirk for her suggestions 
and comments throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank my parents, Michael and 
Diane Pohorylo, for their years of guidance, without which this Note would not be possible.  Finally, 
this Note is dedicated to my wife, Morgan, for her endless encouragement and support.  All errors 
contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 These cases were published as Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
2 See, e.g., Narrow Use of Affirmative Action Preserved in College Admissions, CNN, Dec. 25, 
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/23/scotus.affirmative.action (“[T]his is a wonderful, 
wonderful day—a victory for all of higher education, because what it means at its core is that 
affirmative action may still be used and the court’s given us a road map to get there . . . .” (quoting 
University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman)). 
3 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
4 See 438 U.S. 265, 311–12, 315–17 (1978) (holding that achieving a diverse student body was a 
constitutionally permissible goal for colleges and universities but that race could not be the deciding 
factor in determining whether an applicant was admitted). 
5 See infra notes 111–13 and accompanying text. 
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to public schools.6  Although the Court would be addressing this issue 
within the K–12 education system alone, many experts debated whether 
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases would still be good 
law after a decision was rendered.7  While some experts in higher 
education law believed that the holding would have no effect on the 
Michigan rulings, others believed that the Court would suggest that it was 
“open” to revisiting the 2003 holdings and possibly revising the precedent 
set at that time.8  Many of the fears among the supporters of race-based 
affirmative action were later alleviated when the Court decided Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 19 and left 
the 2003 affirmative action cases seemingly intact.  In reaching the holding 
of Parents Involved, the majority relied heavily on the Court’s earlier 
views on affirmative action as described in Grutter v. Bollinger,10 and 
found that the use of race as a factor in the college admissions process was 
still permitted.11 
But, the Court’s decision was not so simple.  While Parents Involved 
did not overturn the Michigan cases, it did not leave the higher education 
community with the same freedom to administer affirmative action policies 
as the 2003 cases did.  Specifically, Parents Involved subtly set new 
requirements on the use of affirmative action within the college admissions 
                                                                                                                          
6 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006); Meredith 
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 1178 (2006); see also Jeffrey Selingo, Supreme Court Will 
Hear Affirmative-Action Cases with Potentially Broad Meaning for Higher Education, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), June 16, 2006, at A26 (claiming that the effect of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision to decide the legality of using race as a factor in assigning students to public schools 
on the University of Michigan affirmative action cases was “unclear” and “the subject of much 
debate”). 
7 After the Court granted certiorari to decide the constitutionality of assigning K–12 students to 
schools based on race, higher-education lawyers created three scenarios that could result for colleges 
from the forthcoming decisions: 
Scenario 1.  The decisions would contain language that provided colleges with 
guidance on how to apply the Michigan rulings.  The court did not endorse a single 
admissions method in its mixed decisions in 2003.  In one case, the court upheld the 
race-conscious admissions policies used by Michigan’s law school because the 
school considered each applicant individually.  In the other case, the justices struck 
down the admissions policy at Michigan’s main undergraduate college because it 
awarded each black, Hispanic, and American Indian applicant a 20-point bonus on a 
150-point scale. 
Scenario 2.  The rulings would suggest that the court was open to revisiting the 
Michigan decisions through another case involving race-conscious admissions at 
colleges. 
Scenario 3.  The decisions would be narrowly tailored and would apply only to 
public school districts. 
Selingo, supra note 6. 
8 Id. 
9 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).  At the time of publication, this case had not been published in the U.S. 
Reporter.  For that reason, all citations to Parents Involved reference the Supreme Court Reporter. 
10 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
11 Peter Schmidt, High Court Leaves Michigan Cases Intact, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., 
D.C.), July 6, 2007, at A1. 
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process and, perhaps, began a trend towards restricting the holdings of the 
University of Michigan cases.  The purpose of this Note is to examine 
these new requirements by focusing on the impact the holding of Parents 
Involved will have on the past affirmative action cases, as well as the future 
use of affirmative action within the college admissions process.  This Note 
also argues that the judicial branch should refrain from any further 
restriction on affirmative action policies due to the beneficial effect diverse 
student bodies have on the learning experiences and personal development 
of all college students, as well as societal growth in general. 
Part II of this Note examines the history of affirmative action programs 
in the United States and maps its current impact on college enrollment.  It 
specifically looks at the development of affirmative action programs as 
they moved from the realm of employment law into the college admissions 
process.  It also examines how the federal government served as a catalyst 
for institutions to create their own internal affirmative action policies.  Part 
III summarizes the leading federal affirmative action cases of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the circuit courts and looks at one important case at the 
state level.  Although this list is by no means exhaustive of the case law in 
this area, it looks specifically at those cases which have had the greatest 
impact on this area of the law.  In Part IV, this Note analyzes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Parents Involved and the impact it will have on the use 
of affirmative action policies in college admissions programs.  Finally, Part 
V argues that the Supreme Court should not look to alter the holdings of 
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases in future decisions 
until the “playing field” for college admissions is level for students of all 
backgrounds.12  This final section of the Note shows that researchers have 
found that while minority students immediately benefit from affirmative 
action programs by receiving an “edge” in the application process, all 
students, and even all of society, will eventually benefit from the existence 
of racially diverse colleges and universities.  Additionally, this Note argues 
that the level of diversity required to achieve these benefits cannot be 
achieved through alternative admissions policies.  As a result, this Note 
concludes by arguing that race-based affirmative action policies are 
currently needed to ensure that colleges maintain diverse and, 
consequently, beneficial learning environments. 
                                                                                                                          
12 Another threat to affirmative action, which this Note does not address but affirmative action 
advocates  should be aware of, can come from ballot initiatives.  Voters in Washington, Michigan, and 
Nebraska have all passed bans on race-based affirmative action policies with about fifty-eight percent 
of the vote, while California voters approved a ban with fifty-four percent of the vote.  Colorado voters 
very narrowly rejected a ballot measure banning preferences based on race in the 2008 elections by one 
percentage point to become the first state to vote against such a ban.  However, it is argued that the 
ballot was defeated only because of the popularity of Barack Obama at the time of the election.  Reeves 
Wiedeman, Analysis: How Colorado Became the First State to Reject a Ban on Affirmative Action, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Nov. 10, 2008, http://chronicle.com/article/Analysis-Why-
Colorado-Fail/1317. 
 698 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:693 
II.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
For the purpose of this Note, it will be beneficial to understand 
affirmative action as “a policy of favoring qualified women and minority 
candidates over qualified men or nonminority candidates with the 
immediate goals of outreach, remedying discrimination, or achieving 
diversity, and the ultimate goals of attaining a color-blind (racially just) 
and a gender-free (sexually just) society.”13  While it is important to 
understand the role affirmative action plays in attaining gender equality, 
this Note focuses primarily on the goals of attaining what the above 
definition refers to as a racially just society. 
Although the use of race-based affirmative action has been the subject 
of much debate recently and has been litigated over numerous times in 
state and federal courts, the actual practice and recognition of affirmative 
action is fairly new to the United States.  President John F. Kennedy 
adopted the term “affirmative action” in 1961, marking the first time it was 
publicly used in American society.14  When President Kennedy created the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he required that projects 
receiving federal funds take “affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without 
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”15  The affirmative 
action which was called on by President Kennedy to ensure equal 
treatment of employees was intended to apply to the areas of “employment, 
upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; 
layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and 
selection for training, including apprenticeship.”16  The term “affirmative 
action” was later repeated by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965 when he 
revisited Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10,925.17 
Other legislation during the mid-1900s which adopted the term 
                                                                                                                          
13 James P. Sterba, Completing Thomas Sowell’s Study of Affirmative Action and Then Drawing 
Different Conclusions, 57 STAN. L. REV. 657, 659 (2004) (book review).  Sterba goes on to further 
categorize affirmative action programs.  He claims that “all forms of affirmative action can be 
understood, in terms of their immediate goals, as being either outreach, remedial, or diversity 
affirmative action,” and “remedial affirmative action further divides into two subtypes, with one 
subtype simply seeking to end present discrimination and create an equal playing field, and the other 
subtype attempting to compensate for past discrimination and its effects.”  Id. at 661. 
14 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master’s “Tool” to Dismantle His House: Why Justice 
Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 124–25 (2005). 
15 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 44, 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961) (emphasis added). 
16 Id. 
17 See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 187, 12,319 (Sept. 28, 1965).  Using the same 
wording as Kennedy’s Executive Order No. 10,925, Johnson mandated that “[t]he contractor will not 
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or 
national origin.  The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and 
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national 
origin.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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“affirmative action” included Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,18 
also a product of the Johnson administration.  Concerning employers that 
had intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice, section 
706(g) of the Act provided courts with the authority to 
enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as 
may be appropriate, which may include reinstatement or 
hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by 
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as 
the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment 
practice).19 
Similar to the other non-discrimination statutes of this era, this section of 
the Civil Rights Act was designed specifically to remedy intentional acts of 
discrimination. 
Five years later, President Richard Nixon adopted the “Philadelphia 
Plan” which went one step further in the government’s quest to increase 
minority presence in the American workforce.  Rather than providing a 
remedy to minority workers for discriminatory practices by their 
employers, the “Philadelphia Plan” called for preemptive measures to 
prevent discriminatory behavior.  The plan required specific percentage 
targets of minority employees in construction-related trades to be set forth 
in Philadelphia and incorporated in bids for all government contracts 
issued in that area.20  President Nixon’s 1969 plan was a “revised” version 
of the original “Philadelphia Plan” created by the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”).21  
The original plan, which was created in 1967, was declared illegal because 
it did not contain “‘definite minimum standards on which approval or 
disapproval of an affirmative action program would be based.’”22  The 
revised plan by the Nixon administration avoided this shortcoming by 
implementing the above mentioned targets.23  While the “Philadelphia 
Plan,” along with the Civil Rights Act and the executive orders of 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, were major steps toward eliminating 
overt discrimination in American society, in order to address discrete and 
unintentional forms of discrimination, affirmative action policies were 
                                                                                                                          
18 Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006)). 
19 Id. at 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) (emphasis added).  Congress later added  “or any 
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate” as part of a court’s authority to order affirmative 
action measures.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
20 Mitchell J. Chang et al., Race in Higher Education: Making Meaning of an Elusive Moving 
Target, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 517, 529 (Philip G. 
Altbach et al. eds., 2005). 
21 JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 136, 193 (1996). 
22 Id. at 138. 
23 Id. at 195. 
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necessary at the institutional level, and colleges and universities were the 
right place for this change.24 
As a result of these early affirmative action programs created by the 
federal government, the adoption of affirmative action policies at colleges 
and universities came in several different forms.  Some institutions reacted 
to the legislation of the mid-1900s described above by actively recruiting 
minority students as a part of their educational mission.25  Consequently, in 
order to increase minority enrollment, many of these same institutions 
began to initiate admissions policies that took race into consideration.26  
However, not every institution followed this trend and many affirmative 
action programs were the result of coercion by the government.  After the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act, the federal government sought to 
implement the goals of the statute by “demanding that colleges and 
universities institute ‘Affirmative Action’ programs which would end all 
forms of racial discrimination in the hiring of staff, admission of students, 
granting of financial aid, and allocation of dormitory space.”27  Threats 
were made to institutions such as Columbia, Harvard, Cornell, and 
Michigan, to withhold federal funds if implementation of affirmative 
action policies were too slow.28  A 1974 report published for the Carnegie 
Commission in Higher Education also stated that many colleges and 
universities were being forced to lower their overall academic standards in 
order to meet the demands of affirmative action policies.29 
Regardless of the reasons an institution chose to institute affirmative 
action policies, it became clear that the demands from both the government 
and the institutions themselves for the creation of such policies during the 
1960s were the result of three challenges facing society.30  First, African 
Americans were intentionally excluded from participation in certain 
                                                                                                                          
24 See BRIAN PUSSER, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE 26 (2004) (stating that aggressive forms of 
affirmative action were needed to remedy discrimination that could not be addressed by the Civil 
Rights Act). 
25 See Dorothy Garrison-Wade & Chance W. Lewis, Affirmative Action: History and Analysis, J. 
COLL. ADMISSIONS, Summer 2004, at 24 (noting that colleges reacted to President Johnson’s 
Executive Order by actively recruiting minority students). 
26 Id. 
27 JOHN S. BRUBACHER & WILLIS RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 79 (4th ed. 
2004). 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  In addition to affirmative action policies, there was also some pressure during this time to 
implement “open-admissions” policies at colleges and universities.  In 1970, political pressure forced 
the City University of New York’s Board of Higher Education to adopt a policy guaranteeing entrance 
into some branch of the city’s higher education to all high school graduates.  This policy granted 
admission to graduates regardless of their academic standing.  While there was much controversy over 
this plan, it did prove successful as minority enrollment increased from 18.8% in 1969, which was the 
year before the policy was implemented, to 35.6% in 1974.  Id. 
30 See John R. Howard, Affirmative Action in Historical Perspective, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION’S 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE 19, 30 (Mildred Garcia ed., 1997) (stating that “[t]he new social and intellectual 
realities crystallized in three propositions which came to serve as the basis for new social policy”). 
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aspects of society.31  “Second, it [became] necessary to act affirmatively to 
eliminate institutional barriers to equal participation.”32  Finally, in order to 
eliminate these barriers to equal participation, new standards were needed 
to ensure access to education for groups suffering from the effects of 
discrimination.33 
Unfortunately, while affirmative action policies have the aim of 
addressing these challenges, the aftermath of the proliferation of race-
based affirmative action policies in colleges and universities during the 
1960s and 1970s has had mixed results.  Between 1954 and 1970, African 
American enrollment in colleges in the North and West increased from 
45,000 to 95,000, and in 1970 African American students made up seven 
percent of all full time undergraduates in the United States.34  Despite these 
gains, the percentage of college admissions of African American males 
declined between 1976 and 1986,35 and there was little increase in African 
American enrollment after 1976.36 
The last two decades have seen a general trend of a growth in college 
enrollment of underrepresented groups but the numbers are still low 
despite the presence of race-based affirmative action policies.  The number 
of racial minority students in all four year institutions in 1995 stood at 
1,866,600, which was approximately 21.5% of the total student 
population.37  This figure was up from an enrollment of 931,000 minority 
students in 1976.38  In 2000, African Americans constituted 11.3% of 
overall college enrollment, while Latino students constituted 9.5% and 
American Indians constituted 1%.39  Slight increases carried into 2007, as 
the percentage of African American students was at 13.1% at the time and 
the percentage of Latino students stood at 11.4%.40  Sadly, American 
Indian enrollment remained at 1% of the student population.41  Again, 
while these numbers are still too low given the growth in affirmative action 
policies, it is important to note that without affirmative action policies 
                                                                                                                          
31 Id. 
32 PUSSER, supra note 24, at 26 (citing Howard, supra note 30, at 30). 
33 See Howard, supra note 30, at 30 (“Breaking down institutional barriers entailed reexamining 
some of the criteria conventionally used to mediate access to schools, colleges, universities, and the 
work place.”). 
34 BRUBACHER & RUDY, supra note 27, at 80–81. 
35 See id. at 400 (citing findings by the American Council on Education). 
36 See id. (citing statistics derived from the U.S. Department of Education). 
37 Chang et al., supra note 20, at 520. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 520 tbl.18.1. 
40 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, TOTAL FALL ENROLLMENT IN DEGREE-GRANTING 
INSTITUTIONS, BY RACE/ETHNICITY, SEX, ATTENDANCE STATUS, AND LEVEL OF STUDENT: 
SELECTED YEARS, 1976 THROUGH 2007 (2008), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ 
d08/tables/dt08_227.asp. 
41 Id. 
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enrollment of racial minority students would be even lower.42 
III.  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE COURTS 
A.  Pretext to Bakke 
Although Regents of the University of California v. Bakke43 marked the 
first time the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legality of affirmative 
action policies in the college admissions process, there were several cases 
prior to Bakke which prepared the way for the Court’s 1978 decision.  
Among the first was Griggs v. Duke Power Co.44  Alleging a violation of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiffs in Griggs claimed that their 
employer instituted a policy that made it nearly impossible for minority 
applicants to gain employment in some of the divisions of the company.  
According to their complaint, the employer had instituted a requirement 
that all applicants possess a high school diploma and achieve a satisfactory 
score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests before they could be 
considered for employment within certain divisions.45  In finding for the 
plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court held that neither of these requirements 
had a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for 
which they were used and were thus invalid.46  The Court also found that 
Title VII prohibited unnecessary hiring and employment policies that had a 
disparate racial impact.47  This holding by the Court “set the stage for 
[Bakke and] race conscious affirmative action in two ways.”48  First, the 
holding hinted that a race conscious remedy is sometimes justified for the 
removal of arbitrary obstacles to members of a minority group.49  Second, 
“in holding that policies with disparate racial impact were actionable, 
Griggs articulated a race-conscious standard for a prima facie violation of 
Title VII.”50 
Another case that served as a precursor to Bakke was Defunis v. 
Odegaard.51  The plaintiff in Defunis brought suit claiming that 
preferences were given to non-resident minority students in the admissions 
                                                                                                                          
42 See Chang et al., supra note 20, at 529 (“[I]f colleges and universities were forced to admit 
students based solely on grades and test scores, [African American student] enrollment at the nation’s 
most selective colleges would likely plummet from about 6 percent to less than 2 percent.”). 
43 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
44 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
45 Id. at 427–28. 
46 Id. at 431. 
47 Id. at 430–31. 
48 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1195, 1209 (2002). 
49 Id.  Anderson suggests that such a remedy to these obstacles could be actively recruiting 
prospective employees from other racial groups.  Id. 
50 Id. 
51 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973), dismissed as moot, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974). 
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process for the University of Washington School of Law, yet no preference 
was given to residents of the state of Washington.52  As a result of this 
structure, the plaintiff was able to show that minority applicants were being 
admitted to the school with lesser academic qualifications than those of the 
plaintiff and other resident applicants.53  The Supreme Court of 
Washington upheld the university’s affirmative action program, after the 
trial court had found against the institution,54 holding that the program was 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.  Using language that 
foreshadowed the majority opinion in Bakke, the court found that there was 
a compelling state interest in promoting integration in public education and 
producing a racially balanced student body.55  The court also found a 
compelling interest in the state responding to the “shortage of minority 
attorneys.”56  Unfortunately, this case was never decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court, despite the fact that it granted certiorari, because the Court 
later found that the issue was moot.57 
B.  Bakke 
Five years after DeFunis, the U.S. Supreme Court had another 
opportunity to address the legality of race-based affirmative action policies 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.58  The plaintiff in 
Bakke was a white male who had been rejected twice from the medical 
school at the University of California at Davis.59  He brought suit claiming 
that the school’s policy of reserving sixteen spots in the incoming class for 
minority students was unconstitutional.60  The plaintiff also challenged the 
school’s policy of evaluating minority candidates under a special 
admissions program,61 which allowed them to remain separate from their 
peers in the regular admissions program.62 
                                                                                                                          
52 Id. at 1171–72, 1176. 
53 Id. at 1176–77. 
54 Id. at 1188. 
55 Id. at 1182. 
56 Id. at 1184. 
57 See Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974) (“Because the petitioner will complete 
his law school studies at the end of the term for which he has now registered regardless of any decision 
this Court might reach on the merits of this litigation, we conclude that the Court cannot, consistently 
with the limitations of Art. III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues 
tendered by the parties.”). 
58 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
59 Id. at 276–77. 
60 Id. at 275, 277–78. 
61 Applicants under the special admissions program performed significantly worse at their 
undergraduate institutions than Bakke did.  Bakke’s grade point average as an undergraduate was 3.46.  
For the class entering the medical school in 1973, the average grade point average of special admittees 
was 2.88 and the average for the class entering in 1974 was 2.62.  Id. at 277–78 n.7. 
62 Id. at 274. 
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When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,63 Justice Powell 
articulated the test that would apply to future reviews of challenges to race-
conscious affirmative action policies.  In his “opinion of one,”64 Justice 
Powell held that an admissions decision that is based on race would be 
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if it could withstand 
the “most exacting judicial examination.”65  Furthermore, Justice Powell 
found that the university’s policies could only withstand such an 
examination if it was “precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.”66  In determining which test to apply to a violation 
of Title VI claim, Justice Powell held that the same standard would be 
applied as under the Equal Protection Clause.67 
Affirming the state court’s decision, Justice Powell found that while 
there was a compelling governmental interest in remedying the effects of 
past discrimination, there was no evidence that the current admissions 
policies were intended to do just that.68  However, concerning what the 
Court saw as the university’s primary purpose in implementing the 
admissions policies at issue—ensuring a diverse student body—Powell 
held that the attainment of a diverse student body “clearly is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”69  
Justice Powell relied on the four essential freedoms of colleges and 
universities articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire70 to argue that the freedom of a university to make its own 
                                                                                                                          
63 Finding that the university violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court of 
California held the school’s affirmative action policies to be unconstitutional and ordered the plaintiff’s 
admission to the medical school.  Id. at 279–81.  The court specifically stated that “[a]lthough [it] 
agreed that the goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians 
willing to serve members of minority groups were compelling state interests, it concluded that the 
special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving those goals.”  Id. at 279. 
64 Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Glass Half Full: Envisioning the Future of Race Preference 
Policies, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 385, 387 (2008).  Justice Powell wrote a majority opinion in 
which four Justices concurred with his conclusion but did not join in his reasoning.  Id. at 386.  Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun disagreed that the university’s admissions program was 
unconstitutional.  Bakke, 438 U.S at 325–26 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
Justice Stevens, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, concurred 
in the judgment in part and dissented in part because he found that since the university’s admissions 
program violated Title VI, the Court did not need to consider the constitutional issue.  Id. at 412–13 
(Stevens, J., concurring with the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
65 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291. 
66 Id. at 299. 
67 Id. at 287.  This was an important aspect of the holding because it meant that all private schools 
which received federal funding were subject to this decision even though they were not subject to the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
68 Id. at 307, 309. 
69 Id. at 311–12. 
70 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).  Concerning the four freedoms of a university, Justice Frankfurter 
stated: 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive 
to speculation, experiment and creation.  It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 
“the four essential freedoms” of a university—to determine for itself on academic 
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may 
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judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.71   
Despite this endorsement of university autonomy, in analyzing the policies 
at the University of California, Justice Powell held that the “diversity that 
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a 
single though important element.”72  Therefore, while the Court held that 
diversity was a compelling governmental interest, it stated that race and 
ethnicity could not be the only aspects considered when attempting to 
achieve a diverse student body.  Justice Powell also held that “admissions 
programs, which take race into account in achieving the educational 
diversity valued by the First Amendment,”73 can only deem race or ethnic 
background as a “plus” in an applicant’s file.74  Stated another way, race 
could not be a decisive factor in determining whether an applicant would 
be admitted.75 
C.  Hopwood 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided the University of Michigan 
affirmative action cases, the state and federal courts had several 
opportunities to address the precedent set in Bakke.76  Some jurisdictions at 
this time were not persuaded by Powell’s decision and began to move 
away from this precedent set by the Supreme Court.  The most prominent 
case which signaled this trend was Hopwood v. Texas.77 
The plaintiffs here challenged the affirmative action programs at the 
University of Texas School of Law under the Equal Protection Clause and 
Title VI.78  Under the university’s admissions system, preference was 
given to African American and Mexican American applicants by altering 
                                                                                                                          
be admitted to study. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
71 Bakke, 438 U.S at 312 (citation omitted). 
72 Id. at 315. 
73 Id. at 316. 
74 Id. at 317. 
75 Although Justice Powell received just one vote for his opinion, as mentioned earlier, four other 
Justices—Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun—supported the inclusion of race in the college 
admissions process and actually argued that the university’s use of race here was reasonable and thus 
constitutional.  Id. at 325–26, 376 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Perhaps this 
is why the holding was so influential despite not carrying any other judges. 
76 See, e.g., Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968, 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Bakke to discuss the 
acceptable uses of race-based affirmative action plans); DeRonde v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 625 P.2d 
220, 225 (Cal. 1981) (following the standards articulated by Powell to uphold the University of 
California’s admissions policies); McDonald v. Hogness, 598 P.2d 707, 711–13 (Wash. 1979) (using 
the holding in Bakke to find that the University of Washington’s affirmative action program did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
77 See 78 F.3d 932, 941–46 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing the court’s departure from Bakke). 
78 Id. at 938. 
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their admissions score.79  In addition to maintaining different admissions 
levels for minorities and whites, the law school established a segregated 
application evaluation process as well.80 
At the district court level, the University of Texas argued that there 
were several justifications for their affirmative action policies, including 
the need to achieve a diverse student body and the need to remedy the 
present effects of past discrimination.81  In its examination of the 
affirmative action policies, the district court found that these justifications 
met “constitutional muster.”82  The court found against the University of 
Texas, though, because its admissions program allowed for separate review 
of minority applications and was not narrowly tailored.83 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s 
holding and departed from the precedent established in Bakke.  Concerning 
the need to maintain a diverse student body, the court held that since 
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke received only his own vote,84 it was not 
binding precedent.  As a result, the court found that it had the authority to 
hold that the need to maintain a diverse student body was not a compelling 
interest which could withstand strict scrutiny because “classification of 
persons on the basis of race for the purpose of diversity frustrates . . . the 
goals of equal protection.” 85 
The court was also not persuaded by the university’s claim that the 
policies were needed to remedy past discrimination.  In order to pass 
constitutional review, the court held that the state of Texas would have to 
find that past segregation had present effects, it would have to determine 
the magnitude of those present effects, and it would need to limit the 
advantage provided to applicants to remedy that harm.86  Since these 
elements were not present, the court found that the justification of 
remedying past discrimination was not a viable defense for the university.87 
The Hopwood decision severely restricted how colleges could decide 
which students would be admitted to their student bodies.  Although it did 
                                                                                                                          
79 Id. at 936 (“In March 1992, for example, the presumptive TI admission score for resident 
whites and non-preferred minorities was 199.  Mexican Americans and blacks needed a TI of only 189 
to be presumptively admitted.  The difference in the presumptive-deny ranges is even more striking. 
The presumptive denial score for ‘nonminorities’ was 192; the same score for blacks and Mexican 
Americans was 179.”).  Consequently, minority students with lower grade point averages and LSAT 
scores were being admitted over students from majority groups with higher grade point averages and 
LSAT scores.  Id. 
80 Id. at 937. 
81 Id. at 938. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 939. 
84 Id. at 944 (“Justice Powell’s argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote and has never 
represented the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 951. 
87 Id. 
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not create mandatory law at the national level, Hopwood served to produce 
a significant effect on the educational institutions within the Fifth Circuit 
by diminishing minority representation on their campuses.88  Institutions 
were able to mitigate this effect of the decision over time,89 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court had the opportunity nearly ten years later to revisit Bakke 
and clarify its position on race-based affirmative action policies before 
other circuits felt compelled to follow the precedent of Hopwood.90 
D.  The University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases 
The University of Michigan affirmative action cases were two distinct 
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003 which constituted the 
most anticipated civil rights decisions in a long period.91  Although the 
Court only upheld the affirmative action policies of the University of 
Michigan in one of these cases, both decisions looked to Bakke for 
guidance and upheld Justice Powell’s majority opinion.  Furthermore, and 
perhaps more importantly, both decisions clearly established a path 
colleges could take to ensure diversity within their campuses.92 
In Gratz v. Bollinger,93 the plaintiffs sued the University of Michigan 
claiming that its affirmative action program for the undergraduate school 
                                                                                                                          
88 After the Hopwood decision was rendered, there was a decline in African American and 
Mexican American enrollment at the University of Texas School of Law.  Since 1947, Texas had 
enrolled and graduated more African American and Mexican American lawyers than any non-minority 
law school in America.  At one point, one out of every eleven Mexican American lawyers was a 
graduate of the University of Texas School of Law.  However, the year after Hopwood, African 
American enrollment dropped to 0.9% of the incoming class and Mexican American enrollment fell to 
5.6%.  This was the lowest level for both groups since affirmative action was adopted at the university 
in 1983.  Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View from a Limestone Ledge, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (2003). 
89 See id. at 1600 (finding that in 1997, the Texas Legislature enacted H.B. 588, which granted 
high school seniors graduating in the top ten percent of their class automatic admission to their choice 
of state university and the University of Texas has almost returned to its pre-Hopwood numbers 
concerning minority enrollment). 
90 Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not revisit this issue until 2003, the circuit courts had 
several opportunities to produce their own opinions on the subject.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents 
of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that Powell’s decision in Bakke was not 
binding on this issue before the court); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (holding that student body diversity could be a compelling interest which justified the use of 
race-based preferences in admissions policies). 
91 See David Schimmel, Commentary, Affirming Affirmative Action: Supreme Court Holds 
Diversity to Be a Compelling Interest in University Admissions, 180 EDUC. L. REP. 401, 401 (2003) 
(“The two University of Michigan admissions cases were the most controversial and eagerly awaited 
civil rights decisions in years.”). 
92 See supra note 2.  But see Barbara Lauriat, Note, Trump Card or Trouble?  The Diversity 
Rationale in Law and Education, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1191 (2003) (“The ambiguity of Justice 
O’Connor’s durational requirement for the use of race-conscious admissions to achieve diversity is 
extremely troubling.”); Garrick B. Pursley, Note, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a 
Transformative Concept of Diversity in Higher Education, 82 TEX. L. REV. 153, 154 (2003) (arguing 
that Grutter has left uncertainty regarding the concept of diversity). 
93 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.94  The district court 
found that the university’s admissions office “consider[ed] a number of 
factors in making admissions decisions, including high school grades, 
standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength, 
geography, alumni relationships, and leadership.”95  The university used 
these factors to assign each candidate a score as part of a selection index.96  
Under the affirmative action program, a student who was a member of an 
underrepresented group was entitled to an automatic twenty points.97  
These additional points alone could move an applicant from the “rejection” 
category to the “postpone or admit” category under the selection index.  
Minority students could also be flagged by an admissions counselor and 
receive additional review that was not available to students from majority 
groups.98 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist used the district court’s 
findings to invalidate the university’s affirmative action program.  
Applying the strict scrutiny standard,99 the Court found that the policy of 
awarding minority applicants an automatic twenty points made race a 
decisive factor for admissions and was a violation of Bakke.100  The Court 
also found that the awarding of points to minority applicants did not 
provide individualized consideration of each student’s qualifications.101  As 
a result, the undergraduate admissions policy could not survive the strict 
scrutiny test because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
university’s compelling interest in achieving a diverse student body.102 
Although decided at the same time as Grutter v. Bollinger,103 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist relied somewhat on the majority opinion from Grutter in 
writing the majority opinion for Gratz.104  Similar to Gratz, the plaintiff in 
Grutter sued the University of Michigan, claiming that its law school 
admissions policies violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI.  
However, the affirmative action policies adopted by the law school’s 
admissions department were significantly different than the policies used at 
                                                                                                                          
94 Id. at 252. 
95 Id. at 253. 
96 Id. at 255 (“This index was divided linearly into ranges generally calling for admissions 
dispositions as follows: 100–50 (admit); 95–99 (admit or postpone); 90–94 (postpone or admit); 75–89 
(delay or postpone); 74 and below (delay or reject).”). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 274. 
99 Id. at 270 (“It is by now well established that ‘all racial classifications reviewable under the 
Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.’” (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 224 (1995))). 
100 See id. at 272 (noting that Justice Powell allowed an applicant’s race to be considered without 
being decisive in the decision making process). 
101 Id. at 277. 
102 Id. at 275. 
103 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
104 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 277. 
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the undergraduate level.  The law school ranked each applicant according 
to their performance as undergraduate students and on the LSAT, but high 
achievement in these areas did not guarantee admission.105  Admissions 
officers would also consider “soft variables” such as the quality of the 
applicant’s undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant’s essay, 
and the applicant’s likely contributions to the intellectual and social life of 
the law school.106  The goal of this policy was to achieve diversity at the 
school by enrolling a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority 
students,107 and, while the administration had a commitment to achieving 
racial and ethnic diversity, it did not give that factor substantial weight 
over all other factors nor did it define diversity only in terms of race.108 
Using the strict scrutiny test,109 Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, adopted the precedent set in Bakke and found in favor of the 
university.110  The Court agreed with Bakke that student body diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest,111 and found that the university’s 
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.112  
Specifically, the Court noted that the holistic review of applicants adopted 
by the admissions policy was flexible enough to ensure individual 
treatment of each student.113  The Court also found that there was no policy 
of automatic acceptance or rejection based on any single “soft” variable, 
such as race,114 and the desire to enroll a “critical mass” of 
underrepresented students did not alter this flexibility.115  These several 
findings by the Court were, in its own words, consistent with the “tradition 
of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within 
constitutionally prescribed limits.”116  However, it is important to note that 
                                                                                                                          
105 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 316. 
108 Id. at 315–16. 
109 Id. at 326. 
110 See id. at 323 (“Justice Powell’s opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as 
the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies.”). 
111 Id. at 325.  In addition to relying on the precedent in Bakke, the Court gave several of its own 
reasons why it believed that diversity in the student body was a compelling interest.  First, it found that 
education was the foundation of good citizenship and therefore the “diffusion of knowledge” must be 
accessible to all individuals.  Second, the Court found that law schools in particular are training 
grounds for the nation’s leaders and that in order to cultivate a legitimate set of leaders, it is necessary 
that this path to leadership (i.e., higher education) be visibly open to individuals of every race and 
ethnicity.  Id. at 331–32. 
112 Id. at 334.  The Court did clearly articulate that to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious 
admissions program cannot use a quota system.  Id. 
113 Id. at 337. 
114 Id. Justice O’Connor noted additionally that all applicants have the opportunity to highlight 
their own potential diversity contributions through the submission of a personal statement, letters of 
recommendation, and an essay, and that the school gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides 
race.  Id. at 338. 
115 Id. at 340. 
116 Id. at 328. 
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while the Court upheld the use of the university’s affirmative action 
policies, it indicated that the justifications which it relied on were not fixed 
in time.117 
In sum, Grutter stands for the rule that diversity is a compelling state 
interest that will justify the use of race in the admissions process so long as 
each applicant is evaluated on an individual basis and race serves as only 
one factor among many that are considered.118  In combination with Gratz 
and Bakke, universities also understood that Grutter prohibited the use of 
quotas and the adoption of separate review processes for minority 
students.119  Nor could universities use race-based affirmative action 
policies as a permanent means of achieving a racial diverse student 
body.120  Finally, Grutter also required that universities should actively and 
in good faith consider race neutral alternatives for achieving diverse 
student bodies.121 
While the ruling of Grutter was heralded by many as a victory for 
affirmative action and as a clear map for universities to implement their 
own affirmative action policies,122 it was just as quickly condemned by 
members of the legal community as well.123  Regardless of criticism toward 
the decision, the Michigan affirmative action cases represented the law of 
the land for several years.  As the next section of this Note indicates, this 
law changed somewhat for universities in 2007 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court decided Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1.124 
                                                                                                                          
117 See id. at 341–42 (noting that solidifying a permanent justification for racial preferences would 
offend the fundamental equal protection principle of doing away with all government-imposed 
discrimination based on race).  But see Peter Schmidt, Researchers Bemoan Lack of Progress in 
Closing Education Gaps Between the Races, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 26, 2008, 
http://chronicle.com/article/Researchers-Bemoan-Lack-of/624/ (noting the findings of a group of 
affirmative-action advocates and researchers:  “Justice Sandra Day O’Connor was far too optimistic in 
projecting, in the [Supreme Court’s] 2003 Grutter v. Bollinger decision upholding colleges’ use of 
race-conscious admissions policies, that within 25 years selective colleges would be able to enroll 
sufficiently diverse student bodies without the use of such policies.”). 
118 See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
120 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
121 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. 
122 See supra note 2. 
123 See, e.g., Lauriat, supra note 92, at 1173.  Lauriat argues that the Court was wrong in Grutter 
and the opinion is “flawed in its analysis and conclusion that student-body diversity can serve as a 
compelling government interest to justify the use of race-based preferences in higher education 
admissions policies.”  Id.  She also claims there are strong public policy reasons against the use of 
racial diversity as a criterion for giving advantages in admissions, such as the fact that these programs 
foster racial stereotyping.  Id. at 1197. 
124 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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IV.  THE LEGACY OF PARENTS INVOLVED IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
A.  Parents Involved 
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear Parents Involved in 
2006, there had already been several changes to the makeup of the 
Court.125  Since the authors of the two University of Michigan affirmative 
action cases were no longer on the bench, many spectators were unsure 
how the “new” Court would decide this issue.126 
Parents Involved was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court with a 
companion case, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools.127  The 
plaintiffs in Jefferson County, parents of students enrolled at the Jefferson 
County Public Schools system, sued the county claiming that its school 
assignment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.128  Under the 
assignment plan, if a traditional public school in the county became over-
subscribed, the school board would decide where a student would enroll 
based on factors such as place of residence, school capacity, and program 
popularity.129  If a school remained over-subscribed after consideration of 
these factors, applicants were separated and randomly sorted into four lists 
at each grade level: Black Male, Black Female, White Male, and White 
Female.130  Students were then selected by the principals in a manner that 
would keep the schools within the racial guidelines of the assignment 
plan.131 
Concerning the magnet schools, students were normally assigned to 
the school closest to where he or she resided unless that school exceeded 
its capacity or “hover[ed]” at the extreme ends of the racial guidelines.132  
Other factors that were considered besides race included student essays, 
recommendations, a work sample or audition, attendance data, and 
standardized test scores.133  Therefore, in assigning students to the magnet 
schools, “race [wa]s simply one possible factor among many, acting only 
                                                                                                                          
125 Justice O’Connor, the author of Grutter, had retired and been replaced by Justice Alito, while 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Gratz, had passed away and was succeeded by Chief Justice 
Roberts.  See Supreme Court Nominations Research Guide, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/guides/ 
supreme_court_nominations.cfm (last visited July 21, 2009) (indicating that Justice Alito was 
confirmed on January 31, 2006, to replace Justice O’Connor, and Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed 
on September 29, 2005, to replace Chief Justice Rehnquist). 
126 See, e.g., Selingo, supra note 6. 
127 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert granted sub 
nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct 2351 (2006), rev’d sub nom. Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
128 Jefferson County, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 836. 
129 Id. at 842. 
130 Id. at 847. 
131 Id.  The assignment plan required schools in the county to seek a black student enrollment of at 
least fifteen percent and no more than fifty percent.  Id. at 842. 
132 Id. at 844. 
133 Id. at 845. 
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occasionally as a permissible ‘tipping’ factor in most of the [school] 
assignment process.”134 
The district court first found that the assignment plan for non-
traditional magnet schools in the district was permissible under the 
Constitution.135  In doing so, the court held that the school district “met its 
burden of establishing a compelling interest in maintaining racially 
integrated schools.”136  The court went on to find that the assignment plan 
was narrowly tailored because it did not operate as a quota,137 it allowed 
for individualized review,138 it did not unduly harm any member of a racial 
group,139 and it gave serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral 
alternatives to achieve its goals.140 
However, the court did find that the plan’s assignment of students to 
traditional high schools was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.141  
Specifically, the portion of the assignment plan that placed applicants in 
schools based on race was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly 
tailored to meet the objective of achieving diversity in the student body.142  
The court found that the plan made race the defining feature of a student’s 
application,143 which was in violation of Grutter.  The court also found that 
the plan was not narrowly tailored because the assignment process put 
applicants on separate assignment tracks based on race and the plan’s use 
of the separate lists was completely unnecessary to accomplish the Board’s 
goal.144  This decision of the district court was affirmed by the Sixth 
Circuit in a unanimous decision with no written opinion.145 
The claim in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1146 was similar to that of Jefferson County.  Here, a group of 
                                                                                                                          
134 Id. at 859. 
135 Id. at 837. 
136 Id. at 855.  The court was compelled by the arguments in Grutter which found that there was a 
compelling interest in maintaining a racially integrated university.  It held that “[l]ike institutions of 
higher education, elementary and secondary schools are ‘pivotal to ‘sustaining our political and cultural 
heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society.’”  Id. at 852–53 (citation 
omitted). 
137 Id. at 858. 
138 Id. at 859. 
139 Id. at 861. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 837. 
142 Id. at 864. 
143 Id. at 863. 
144 Id. at 862.  Concerning the claim that the plan was not necessary to accomplish the Board’s 
goal, the court argued that “[u]nder the general law of probabilities, if applicants were selected off of 
one random draw list, the ratio of Black to White students in the applicant pool at a particular school 
would be reflected in the ratio of Black to White students in the pool of admitted students and, 
consequently, in the school’s student population at large.”  Id. at 863. 
145 See McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 
2005) (“Because the reasoning which supports judgment for defendants has been articulated in the 
well-reasoned opinion of the district court, the issuance of a detailed written opinion by this court 
would serve no useful purpose.”). 
146 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
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parents sued their school district claiming that the district’s use of a race-
based tiebreaker in determining which high schools students could enroll 
violated state law, the Equal Protection Clause, and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act.147  Under this tiebreaker system, when a school had become 
oversubscribed, the school board chose who could attend a school based on 
four tiebreakers.148  The plaintiffs’ suit was based on the second tiebreaker 
which looked at a student’s race if “the racial make up of [the school’s] 
student body differ[ed] by more than 15 percent from the racial make up of 
the students of the Seattle public schools as a whole—and if the sibling 
preference [did] not bring the oversubscribed high school within plus or 
minus 15 percent of the District’s demographics . . . .”149 
The district court here found in favor of the school district,150 and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding a compelling governmental interest in 
promoting diversity in the classrooms and in “ameliorating real, 
identifiable de facto racial segregation.”151  The court also found that the 
district’s use of a race-based tiebreaker was narrowly tailored because it 
did not constitute a quota system,152 and it did not unduly harm any 
student.153  The court did place a limit on its ruling, however, indicating 
that the plans would not be permitted indefinitely.154 
Finding that both Parents Involved and Jefferson County presented the 
same underlying legal question,155 the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear 
                                                                                                                          
147 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1171. 
148 Id. at 1169.  The tiebreakers were as follows: first, students who have a sibling attending that 
school are admitted; second, if an oversubscribed high school is racially imbalanced the race of the 
applying student is considered; third, students are admitted according to distance from the student’s 
home to the high school; fourth, a lottery is used to allocate the remaining seats.  Id. at 1169–71. 
149 Id. at 1169.  If this situation is present, then the school is considered racially imbalanced.  The 
court provides an example of this imbalance: 
[I]f a school has more than 75 percent nonwhite students (i.e., more than 15 percent 
above the overall 60 percent nonwhite student population) and less than 25 percent 
white students, or when it has less than 45 percent nonwhite students (i.e., more than 
15 percent below the overall 60 percent nonwhite student population) and more than 
55 percent white students, the school is considered racially imbalanced. 
Id. at 1170. 
150 Id. at 1192–93. 
151 Id. at 1178. 
152 See id. at 1186 (“[T]he District’s 15 percent plus or minus trigger point tied to the 
demographics of the Seattle school population is not a quota. It is a context-specific, flexible 
measurement of racial diversity designed to attain and maintain a critical mass of white and nonwhite 
students in Seattle’s public high schools.”). 
153 Id. at 1192.  The court gave three reasons why students were not unduly harmed.  “[First,] the 
District is entitled to assign all students to any of its schools.  [Second,] no student is entitled to attend 
any specific school.  [And finally, third,] the tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit any race or group of 
individuals to the detriment of another . . . .”  Id. 
154 Quoting Grutter, the court expected that the district would review its plan annually so that in 
twenty-five years the use of racial preferences would not be necessary.  Id. 
155 This question was whether a public school that had not operated legally segregated schools or 
has been found to be unitary may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in 
making school assignments.  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2746 (2007). 
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both appeals jointly156 and, subsequently, found that both assignment 
programs were unconstitutional.  Consistent with Bakke and the University 
of Michigan cases, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test to both 
claims157 and articulated only two acceptable compelling interests for the 
use of racial classifications: remedying the effects of past intentional 
discrimination and, as articulated in Grutter, ensuring diversity in higher 
education.158  Concerning the first compelling interest, the Court held that 
neither school system could maintain its current assignment program based 
on the interest of remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination.159  
Regarding the second interest, the Court found that Grutter was limited to 
universities only and “[t]he districts offer[ed] no evidence that the level of 
racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits 
happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school 
districts.”160 
The Court went on to hold that even if the assignment plans were used 
to achieve a compelling government interest, they could not pass the 
narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny test.161  Here, the Court found 
that the two reassignment plans had only a marginal impact in the 
assignment of students for achieving diverse student bodies and doubted 
the necessity of using racial classifications.162  The Court also turned to 
Grutter, which held that colleges must give good faith consideration to 
race neutral alternatives before relying on race-based affirmative action 
                                                                                                                          
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 2751–52. 
158 Id. at 2752–53. 
159 Id. at 2752.  The Court found that the Seattle public schools had not shown that they were ever 
segregated by law and were not subject to court-ordered desegregation decrees.  Also, while the 
Jefferson County schools were once previously segregated by law and were once subject to a court-
ordered desegregation decree, in 2000 the same court that ordered that decree dissolved it because it 
found that the district had “eliminated the vestiges” connected with its former policy of segregation and 
the “pernicious effects” of the decree had already been achieved.  Id. 
160 Id. at 2754, 2756.  The Court refused to extend Grutter to this context despite the fact that two 
circuit courts in these cases, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) and McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Public 
Schools, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005), and one other circuit court, Comfort v. Lynn School 
Community, 418 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2005), found that it did.  Id. at 2754. 
161 See id. at 2755 (noting that they did not have to respond to the amici dispute over whether the 
diversity in these schools was a benefit because it was clear that the racial classifications were not 
narrowly tailored). 
162 Id. at 2759–60.  In Seattle, the court found that “[e]ighty-four students were assigned to 
schools that they did not list as a choice, but 29 of those students would have been assigned to their 
respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were able to attend one of the oversubscribed 
schools due to waitlist and capacity adjustments.”  Id. at 2759.  In Jefferson County, “[e]lementary 
school students are assigned to their first- or second-choice school 95 percent of the time, and transfers, 
which account for roughly 5 percent of assignments, are only denied 35 percent of the time—and 
presumably an even smaller percentage are denied on the basis of the racial guidelines, given that other 
factors may lead to a denial.”  The county estimated that the racial guidelines account for only three 
percent of assignments.  Id. at 2760. 
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programs,163 and found no evidence that either district considered non- 
explicit racial classification.164  Finally, the Court noted that the use of race 
in these two programs was used as a decisive factor that did not allow for 
individualized review of each applicant.165 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in this decision was highly influential 
because he provided the “swing vote” in favor of invalidating the two 
student assignment plans.166  While Kennedy agreed that the assignment 
plans at issue were unconstitutional, he was unable to join the Court 
because they were “too dismissive of the legitimate interest government 
has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their 
race.”167  Also finding that “[t]he plurality opinion [wa]s at least open to 
the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to ignore 
the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling,”168 Justice Kennedy 
wrote separately to voice his objection to the Chief Justice’s reasoning. 
Justice Kennedy was also troubled by the argument that courts should 
prohibit the use of race in school assignment plans unless it is used to 
remedy the effects of de jure segregation.169  This was a mistake, according 
to Kennedy, because limiting the Court’s power to remedying only de jure 
segregation confines “the nature, extent, and duration of governmental 
reliance on individual racial classifications.”170  Therefore, Justice 
Kennedy supported the use of race to remedy both de jure and de facto 
segregation. 
B.  Impact on Higher Education 
Although Parents Involved is concerned with state action at the K–12 
level, higher education administrators must still factor this holding into the 
structure of their school’s affirmative action policies.  There is a tradition 
in the American judicial system of courts either applying or following 
holdings involving K–12 schools in cases where one of the parties is a 
university or college.  Therefore, it is likely that courts will look to Parents 
Involved when deciding future disputes involving affirmative action 
policies at the university level.  An example of this trend can be seen in the 
                                                                                                                          
163 Id. at 2760. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 2753–54. 
166 Garfield, supra note 64, at 411.  Some have argued that because Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was so influential as the deciding vote, it will likely emerge as the foundation for future 
race-based preference cases.  See, e.g., id. at 416. 
167 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); see also id. at 2797 (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest 
that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.”). 
168 Id. at 2791. 
169 Id. at 2796. 
170 Id. 
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holding of Healy v. James.171  In Healy, the Supreme Court applied its 
ruling from Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,172 concerning student speech, to the university setting.173  Quoting 
the often-cited precedent from Tinker, the Healy Court stated that “[a]t the 
outset we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune 
from the sweep of the First Amendment.  ‘It can hardly be argued that 
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’”174 
Turning back to the impact of Parents Involved on higher education, it 
is important to understand from the beginning that Grutter is still good law 
and that the holding of Parents Involved has not been incorporated into 
higher education and will not be part of higher education law until a case is 
before the courts which warrants its application.  In addition, both the 
Parents Involved Court and Justice Kennedy in his concurrence upheld 
Grutter.  Therefore, there is little doubt that the precedent of Grutter is 
controlling law for race-based affirmative action cases.  Specifically, 
Parents Involved found that “what was upheld in Grutter was 
consideration of ‘a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.’”175  
With this statement, the Court acknowledged that race could still be 
considered in the admissions process for colleges and universities.  As a 
result, college administrators should continue to design their affirmative 
action programs concerning the assignment of weight to the applicant’s 
race and ethnicity within the guidelines established by Grutter.  However, 
while Grutter remains good law, it is highly likely that in future lawsuits, 
courts will turn to Parents Involved along with Grutter.  Therefore, the 
holding of Parents Involved cannot be ignored by college administrators 
despite the fact that Grutter has yet to be overruled.  Even for colleges and 
universities that do not violate the requirements set in Grutter, courts may 
still find such policies unconstitutional due to the underlying goals of the 
policies or the methods in which the policies were created.  By following 
both the holdings of Parents Involved and Grutter, colleges and 
universities will avoid an unfavorable holding if faced with a lawsuit.   
1.  Schools Must Exhibit Significant Success Rates 
Under the first restriction articulated by the Parents Involved opinion, 
the Court implied that minor gains in generating a diverse student body 
will not survive the strict scrutiny test.  The Parents Involved Court 
                                                                                                                          
171 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
172 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
173 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180. 
174 Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
175 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2753. 
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highlighted that the major argument of the two school districts in support 
of their assignment plans was that the use of individual race classifications 
for the assignment of students was necessary to achieve the goals of 
maintaining diverse student bodies.176  The Court was not persuaded by 
this argument because of the minimal effect the racial classifications had 
on student assignments overall.177  Specifically, the Court surmised that 
because race had such a minimal effect on student assignments, other 
means that did not use race as a factor would have been more effective.178 
The Court then pointed out that, unlike in Seattle and Louisville, the 
use of race in the admissions policies at the University of Michigan was 
“indispensable” because it had more than tripled the minority 
representation at the law school.179  Therefore, the Court hinted that, in the 
future, schools that implement race-based affirmative action programs will 
need to show significant success rates in enrolling minority students.  
While this “new” rule is not dispositive in determining the legality of 
affirmative action policies since it was not a rule articulated in Grutter, it 
will likely be a persuasive measure on a court in the future.  Also, although 
there is not a bright-line rule for what courts will consider a suitable impact 
on minority enrollment for upholding race-based affirmative action 
policies, it is important to note that in Parents Involved the Court was not 
persuaded by programs that yielded an effect on only three percent of 
school assignments or in situations where the use of race had no effect on 
over one-third of the students subject to the plan.180 
2.  Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action Must Be Seriously 
Considered 
This first way Parents Involved will impact college admissions serves 
as a good transition into the second impact the decision will have on the 
use of race-based affirmative action programs.  As mentioned above, the 
fact that the assignment plans at issue in Parents Involved had a minimal 
impact on the actual assignment of students brought the Court to the 
conclusion that other effective alternatives must have existed.  If favorable 
race-neutral alternatives exist, then a plan that employs the consideration 
                                                                                                                          
176 Id. at 2759. 
177 Id. 
178 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
179 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760. 
180 A research consortium known as Project Seaphe, with members who include sociologists, 
economists, and law professors, intend to perform at least eighteen different studies using the 
information they obtained from higher education institutions, with the intention of finding out the 
effects of race-based affirmative action.  Among the areas this group will examine include “whether 
minority students granted admissions preferences are disproportionately likely to drop out of 
undergraduate science programs, whether or how various admissions preferences affect undergraduate 
retention rates, and how the use of preferences affects social interactions on campuses.”  Peter Schmidt, 
Scholars Mount Sweeping Effort to Measure Effects of Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 18, 2008, at A19. 
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of race will not be considered narrowly tailored.181  The Parents Involved 
Court found that the Seattle district rejected several race-neutral 
alternatives with little or no consideration while Jefferson Country did not 
show any evidence that it considered any alternatives.182  Although the 
Grutter Court articulated the need to consider race-neutral alternatives, 
Parents Involved strengthened this requirement183 by clearly articulating 
that it was one of several controlling factors in its decision to strike down 
the assignment plans.184 
In addition to considering race-neutral alternatives, it is apparent from 
Parents Involved that colleges and universities must clearly document their 
consideration of these alternatives as well to provide evidence to courts of 
this step in their decision making process.  Justice Kennedy provided a list 
of alternatives to the assignment plans used by the school districts in his 
concurrence which gives some insight into what future courts will look for 
universities to have considered.  Kennedy argued: 
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together 
students of diverse backgrounds and races through other 
means, including strategic site selection of new schools; 
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for 
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted 
fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other 
statistics by race.  These mechanisms are race conscious but 
do not lead to different treatment based on a classification 
that tells each student he or she is to be defined by race, so it 
is unlikely any of them would demand strict scrutiny to be 
found permissible.185 
While not all of these alternatives are available to colleges and universities, 
                                                                                                                          
181 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (emphasizing that “[n]arrow tailoring requires ‘serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 339 (2003))). 
182 Id. 
183 While Grutter held that colleges and universities must consider race-neutral alternatives, the 
Court provided the University of Michigan significant latitude in deciding which alternatives they were 
going to consider.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (holding that the district court erred in finding that the 
law school was at fault for failing to consider the use of a lottery system or placing less emphasis on 
GPA and LSAT scores because such alternatives would require too many sacrifices in terms of 
academic quality or diversity). 
184 See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760 (“The districts have also failed to show that they 
considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals.  Narrow 
tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’” (citation 
omitted)).  While the Grutter Court first articulated the need for “serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral alternatives,” the Court failed to dictate what steps a university must take to 
fulfill this requirement.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40.  Parents Involved provides a much stricter 
requirement and more detailed map of what universities must do.  Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760. 
185 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792. 
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such as drawing attendance zones, the Court provides some guidance to 
colleges and universities for achieving this requirement. 
For advice on race neutral alternatives geared toward higher education, 
colleges and universities can turn to a 2004 report by the U.S. Department 
of Education (“DOE”) which lists several alternatives to race-based 
affirmative action policies.186  In formulating these alternatives, the DOE 
analyzed current alternatives used by colleges and universities across the 
country and listed those that have been successful in enrolling a significant 
number of minority students.187  For example, the DOE noted: 
Many colleges and universities around the country are 
partnering with elementary and secondary schools, 
recognizing that these partnerships expand their educational 
mission by giving them an opportunity to put into practice 
education theory.  Moreover, institutions recognize that 
helping to better educate young people who attend 
traditionally low-performing schools will broaden the pool of 
students who can qualify for admission to college.188 
The report also pointed out that several colleges have partnered with 
secondary schools to assist with teacher shortages.189  This effort by 
colleges and universities will also help prepare K–12 students for college. 
Concerning financial aid, the DOE noted that institutions would use 
scholarships to target specific populations such as low-income students or 
students attending high schools which were underrepresented at that 
specific institution.190  At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
the school created an initiative to give the children of low-income families 
an opportunity to attend college without borrowing the funds to do so.  
Entitled the “Carolina Covenant,” the scholarship program “will enable 
low-income students to graduate debt-free if they work on campus [ten] to 
[twelve] hours weekly in a federal work-study job.”191 
There are also alternatives available for race-based affirmative action 
policies in graduate school admissions as well.  The DOE listed the efforts 
by the University of California which implemented a program that enrolls 
disadvantaged or underserved undergraduates and brings them to either the 
Irvine or Santa Cruz campuses to work with faculty mentors in order to 
                                                                                                                          
186 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-
NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 13–79 (2004). 
187 See id. at 23 (stating that the University of Florida increased race neutral outreach, created new 
recruitment materials that emphasized diversity, and provided scholarships to disadvantaged students). 
188 Id. at 24. 
189 See id. at 21 (noting that Texas A&M University “pledged to increase annual graduation rates 
of mathematics, science, technology and foreign language teachers by more than 250 percent in each 
category, as well as the number of bilingual and special education teachers by over 170 percent”). 
190 Id. at 41. 
191 Id. at 43. 
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prepare them to apply to graduate school.192 
Aside from the alternatives suggested by the DOE report, another 
possible race neutral alternative that can be imposed by colleges and 
universities includes establishing top percentage plans similar to that of the 
State of Texas after the Hopwood decision. 
Top percentage plans work for blacks (and Hispanics as well) 
where there is, ironically, rigid separation in residential areas 
and schools.  Where there are many all or nearly all black 
high schools, a college that desires diversity but is prohibited 
from using affirmative action could switch to a system based 
on class standing.193 
However, this plan will not work where high schools are integrated.194  
Also, this plan has been criticized, as used in Texas and Florida, by the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights because the programs do not 
admit to college the same proportion of minority students as are admitted 
under race-based affirmative action plans.195  Percentage plans and their 
inability to replace affirmative action programs will be discussed further in 
Part V. 
3.  Goals to Enroll a Predetermined Range Should Be Eliminated 
The third impact Parents Involved will have on higher education 
concerns the target ranges of students schools adopt as part of their 
admissions policies.  The Court in Parents Involved found that for both 
Seattle and Louisville, “the school district relie[d] upon an individual 
student’s race in assigning that student to a particular school, so that the 
racial balance at the school falls within a predetermined range based on the 
racial composition of the school district as a whole.”196  This range was 
“set solely by reference to the demographics of the respective school 
districts.”197  Looking back at Grutter, the Court noted that the number of 
minority students the school wanted to admit was an undefined 
“meaningful number” that the school felt was “necessary to achieve a 
genuinely diverse student body.”198  Although the use of quotas is barred 
from affirmative action policies, the Grutter Court did allow the university 
                                                                                                                          
192 See id. at 54 (noting that the program is entitled the Summer Undergraduate Research 
Fellowship (“SURF”) program). 
193 Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and 
Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 546 (2002). 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 547. 
196 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746 (emphasis 
added).  Seattle’s expert stated that the sufficient number of students under this range is the amount 
which will allow students to avoid “‘feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality.’”  Id. at 2756 
(citation omitted). 
197 Id. at 2757. 
198 Id. (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003)). 
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to apply a less rigid number scheme for admitting minority students.  The 
“predetermined range” adopted by the school districts in Parents Involved 
seems to be in line with the “meaningful number” goal in Grutter, yet the 
Parents Involved Court has made it clear that the use of such arbitrary 
numbers will not be permissible even if they are not considered quotas.199  
Therefore, while Grutter allowed the use of ranges for enrollment goals, it 
is evident that the Court today would not permit it.  Specifically, Parents 
Involved held that “[t]his working backward to achieve a particular type of 
racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of 
the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw 
under our existing precedent.”200  Although Grutter is still good law, the 
Court clearly articulated its displeasure with the precedent on this issue, so 
colleges and universities will likely need to follow the holding of Parents 
Involved on this matter.  If schools do promote a “meaningful number” or 
seek to enroll a “critical mass,” then Parents Involved suggests that that 
number should be based on well-researched gains the school will receive 
from admitting that range of students.201  However, it may be best for 
colleges to eliminate ranges or numeric goals since it is disfavored by the 
Court, or, as the Court suggests, colleges should base their numeric goals 
through forward looking processes rather then looking backward to 
establish the range. 
4.  Themes of Overall Impact 
As this section indicates, the impact of Parents Involved on the higher 
education setting is subtle.  However, this does not mean admissions 
offices are free to design their affirmative action policies solely in 
accordance with the 2003 University of Michigan cases.  The several types 
of impact Parents Involved will have on higher education can be summed 
up in three different themes.  One theme that emerges is that colleges and 
universities should clearly document their affirmative action policies and 
the decision making processes that led to their implementation.  In 
particular, institutions should document all alternatives to race-based 
affirmative action programs attempted and considered.  If a suit is ever 
brought against a school, this documentation will be extremely beneficial.  
A second theme derived from the impact of the case is that schools must do 
their homework.  Courts will want to see that institutions have come up 
with plausible and effective alternatives to race-based affirmative action 
                                                                                                                          
199 See id. at 2756 (“The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to 
achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the 
respective school districts—or rather the white/nonwhite or black/“other” balance of the districts, since 
that is the only diversity addressed by the plans.”). 
200 Id. at 2757. 
201 See id. at 2755 (criticizing the two assignment plans because the number of minority students 
sought were not connected to any need for a certain level of diversity). 
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programs and they will want to see why current affirmative action policies 
have been deemed most beneficial for meeting the goals of the school.  
Schools that articulate that they are seeking to enroll a “meaningful 
number” of minority students will also need to show the beneficial effect 
that number will have on their student body and the overall goals of the 
institution.  Finally, the Parents Involved holding suggests that courts will 
want affirmative action policies to be as efficient as possible.  The Court 
expressed this theme through its distaste for arbitrary student ranges.  Also, 
the Court established this theme by mandating that schools be able to show 
that their affirmative action policies produce significant results.  Again, 
while Bakke remains good law, college administrations must be cognizant 
of the impact of Parents Involved and the themes listed above.  If colleges 
and universities adhere to these themes and follow the precedent of both 
Parents Involved and Grutter, the longevity of their affirmative action 
programs is likely assured. 
5.  Evidence of Parents Involved’s Impact 
Recently, the Western District of Texas had the opportunity to address 
“one of the first legal attempts to roll back”202 the 2003 University of 
Michigan cases in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.203  Here, the 
plaintiffs, who were Caucasian, had applied to and were both rejected from 
the University of Texas at Austin.204  They sued several defendants 
claiming that the university’s admissions policies discriminated against 
them on the basis of their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
and Civil Rights Acts.205  In finding that the University of Texas’s 
affirmative action policies were constitutional, the court relied heavily on 
Grutter and the standard established within that case.206  However, the 
plaintiffs turned to the holding of Parents Involved, albeit unsuccessfully, 
to support their argument that the university’s policies were in violation of 
federal law.207 
In supporting the argument of this Note that Parents Involved will have 
an influence on future affirmative action disputes concerning the college 
admissions process, the court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s reliance on 
Parents Involved due to the fact that it was a K–12 case.  Instead, the court 
performed a detailed analysis of Parents Involved, implying that the case 
was relevant in this situation.208  Specifically, the court found that the 
                                                                                                                          
202 Scott Jaschik, Court Win for Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2009/08/18/texas. 
203 No. A-08-CA-263-SS, 2009 WL 2513291 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2009). 
204 Id. at *1. 
205 Id. 
206 See id. at *11–14 (analyzing Fisher using the Grutter standards). 
207 See id. at *20 (using Parents Involved to measure the effect of a “narrowly tailored” plan). 
208 See id. at *20–21 (examining Parents Involved and comparing it to Fisher). 
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university’s affirmative action policies were not unconstitutional because, 
unlike the school districts in Parents Involved, “UT’s admissions policy 
does not make race ‘the’ factor nor rely on racial classifications in a 
‘nonindividualized mechanical’ way.  UT has not only considered but 
continues to use race-neutral alternatives in addition to its consideration of 
race.”209 
While the court did reject the plaintiffs’ argument that the university’s 
affirmative action policies were not narrowly tailored because it produced 
minimal gains in admitting under-represented students,210 it is still 
important to note that this argument was raised and analyzed by the court.  
Therefore, although the Western District of Texas rejected this argument, 
this Note contends that it is likely that another district or federal circuit will 
be persuaded by it. 
The impact of Fisher on higher education law cannot be overlooked.  
Although only a district court case, it stands for the proposition that 
Parents Involved is not restricted to fact patterns involving K–12 schools.  
It also establishes that Parents Involved will have a significant effect on 
affirmative action cases involving colleges and universities.  This case 
legitimizes arguments that focus on a university’s use of race-neutral 
alternatives and the success of a university’s affirmative action policies 
which are generally based on the standards articulated in Parents Involved.  
Given the effect Parents Involved will have on future affirmative action 
cases, the next Part of this Note argues that the line should be drawn here 
concerning restrictions on the autonomy of a university to select its own 
student body. 
V.  THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION                             
FOR STUDENTS AND SOCIETY 
While the precedent concerning race-based affirmative action policies 
post-Parents Involved does allow significant autonomy for colleges and 
universities to recruit and admit minority applicants, the courts should not 
look to place any additional restrictions or requirements on how 
admissions departments operate.  Research indicates that college students 
who are part of a racially diverse educational community will benefit in 
terms of their development, both as students and as young adults, and 
society too will benefit from the presence of fully developed college 
graduates.211  In order to achieve the optimal levels of diversity needed to 
ensure these benefits, race-based affirmative actions policies must be used, 
                                                                                                                          
209 Id. at *21. 
210 See id. (“Thus, the mere fact that UT’s consideration of race does not have a large effect on 
diversity, due largely to the overwhelming presence of the Top Ten Percent law, does not mean the 
policy fails to further UT’s compelling interest or is in some way not narrowly tailored for that goal.”). 
211 See infra Part V.A. 
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and any additional restraints placed on college admissions departments 
could lead to the elimination of these beneficial environments. 
A.  Specific Benefits to Society and Individuals 
The benefits to American society and businesses of having students 
who have graduated from diverse colleges and universities are thoroughly 
articulated by Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University.  Bok 
claims that “[a] successful democracy demands tolerance and mutual 
respect from different groups within its citizenry in order to contain the 
religious and ethnic tensions that have riven so many countries around the 
world.”212  College students who are educated in racially diverse 
environments learn this required tolerance and respect.213  Bok also found 
that some scholars have reported that those students who interact across 
racial lines become more civically active, more inclined to help others, and 
more committed to improving their communities than their classmates who 
do not experience the same cross-racial contacts.214  Finally, Bok has found 
that employers look for students who can work effectively with a diverse 
group of employees and clients because of the growing number of 
minorities and immigrants.215  Another benefit to businesses from diversity 
in higher education, which Bok does not argue but is nonetheless apparent, 
is that “diversity promotes creativity and innovation, fosters problem 
solving skills, and adds to organizational flexibility.”216  
Aside from the benefits to society, research has also shown that the 
cognitive and identity development of students is one major benefit of a 
diverse educational environment.  Patricia Gurin argues that 
“undergraduates are at a critical stage in their human growth and 
development in which diversity, broadly defined, can facilitate greater 
awareness of the learning process, better critical thinking skills, and better 
preparation for the many challenges they will face as involved citizens in 
an increasingly pluralistic and democratic society.”217  Gurin’s argument is 
supported not only by her own work with student data from the University 
of Michigan,218 but is also supported by the work of other social scientists.  
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For example, one group of social scientists found that the level of 
classroom diversity was related to small, yet significant, levels of students 
reporting gains in their problem solving and group skills.219  This group 
found that even medium levels of diversity—approximately thirty to forty 
percent—“are positively, if not always significantly, related to a students’ 
reports of learning gains.”220  Research also shows that students who 
engage in a diverse environment in college will show greater intellectual 
engagement and academic motivation, higher satisfaction in their college 
experience, and the ability to understand and appreciate the perspectives of 
groups other than their own.221  Several of these personal developments 
will lead directly to increased retention rates for students.222  Finally, it has 
been found that diversity in higher education disrupts the cycle of 
segregation between the majority and minority groups.223 
While the above studies identify the benefits of a diverse student body, 
it is also important to note the effects on individual students of having a 
racially homogenous college environment.  It has been found that 
“[c]ampuses with high proportions of White students provide limited 
opportunities for interaction across race/ethnicity barriers and limit student 
learning experiences with socially and culturally diverse groups.”224  In 
addition, on campuses with little racial diversity, members of 
underrepresented groups are traditionally viewed as “tokens” by students 
in the majority.225  “Tokenism contributes to the heightened visibility of the 
underrepresented group, exaggeration of group differences, and the 
                                                                                                                          
Michigan.  The analyses found that students who reported high levels of contact with diverse ideas, 
information, and people were more likely to show growth in their active thinking process, show higher 
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394–95. 
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221 See Milem & Hakuta, supra note 217, at 397.  A study of fifty-eight students at Amherst 
College found that because they were learning within a diverse environment, 
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have opportunities to socialize across racial groups and to discuss racial issues.”). 
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Policy and Practice, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 671, 675 (Caroline 
S. Turner et al. eds., 2002). 
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distortion of images to fit existing stereotypes.”226  Minority students can 
also feel alienated by a predominately homogeneous environment;227 
therefore, one could assume this could lead to high dropout rates. 
Although producing a diverse student body is the first step to achieving 
the benefits mentioned in this section, it is important that college 
administrators do not stop there.  Colleges must also sustain an 
environment that ensures students of different races and backgrounds 
interact with each other.  “[P]ositive learning outcomes, including 
increased GPA and likelihood of persistence, are related to the quality of 
interactions a student has with diverse others, as well as the institutional 
support for diversity that a student perceives.”228  Multicultural educational 
programming, through academic courses that deal directly with 
multicultural issues, is one way to produce these beneficial interactions.229  
One group of social scientists suggests that for these types of courses to be 
most effective, they “should involve students in experiential learning using 
methods such as role-playing, values clarification, and brainstorming.”230  
However, it must be noted that even without efforts by college 
administrators to promote interaction between racial groups, campuses that 
are diverse will result in the higher likelihood that students will befriend 
and interact with members of different racial groups.231 
B.  Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action Are Not a Suitable 
Replacement 
Some critics of race-based affirmative action policies argue that a 
diverse student body, along with all the benefits that it provides, can be 
achieved through admissions policies that do not consider race.  One 
popular argument, which has been researched extensively by sociologist 
Thomas Kane, has favored the replacement of race-based affirmative 
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227 See id. at 677–78 (finding that students’ perceptions of discrimination, stemming from a non-
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leading these students to drop out). 
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action policies with income or class-based affirmative action programs.  In 
studying this alternative, Kane found several factors which led to the 
conclusion that income cannot be a substitute for race in affirmative 
action.232  Kane first found, using data from the high school class of 1992, 
that African Americans and Hispanics were about three times as likely to 
have incomes under $20,000 when compared to white students; however, 
African Americans and Hispanics represented less than half of the entire 
low income population.233  As a result, while African Americans and 
Hispanics were more likely to have low incomes, “their absolute numbers 
still represented a minority of the total low-income population.”234  Kane 
also found that among all low-income, high scoring youth, African 
Americans and Hispanics made up only seventeen percent of the 
population and even a smaller number, less than seven percent, made up 
high school graduates with high test scores.235  Kane concluded that a 
“college drawing from the general population would have to admit two 
low-income students from the overall pool of high school graduates to 
yield one black or Hispanic student.”236  This number increases when 
looking at selective colleges.  These colleges, which select students only 
                                                                                                                          
232 See Roland G. Freyer et al., An Economic Analysis of Color-Blind Affirmative Action, 24 J.L. 
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from the pool of high scoring students, would need to admit six students 
under an income-based affirmative action policy to admit one African 
American or Hispanic student.237 
This trend articulated by Kane has been noted by legal scholars as 
well.  It has been argued by these scholars that income-based affirmative 
action is unable to remedy the shortcomings of race-based affirmative 
action policies.238  Specifically, it has been stated that income-based 
affirmative action will not succeed in aiding the minority poor for two 
reasons.239  “First, one must remember that minorities are minorities: there 
are more white poor people than black and Latino poor people, even 
though white poverty rates are lower than black and Latino poverty rates,” 
and, as a result, affirmative action “slots” will go to white students based 
on numbers alone.240  The second reason is that “the basic principles of 
affirmative action weigh against the use of poverty-based affirmative 
action as a tool for aiding the minority poor.”241  Since poor minority 
students are “the bottom of the bottom” they are going to be 
“underrepresented as beneficiaries of poverty-based affirmative action in 
comparison with their proportion among the poor.”242 
Evidence that income-based affirmative action cannot achieve the 
same racial diversity as race-based affirmative action can be seen in the 
effects California’s Proposition 209 has had on the state’s higher education 
enrollment patterns.243  Proposition 209, which amended the state’s 
constitution, holds that the state shall not “grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
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Id. at 466. 
243 Specific evidence can also be seen in the University of Texas system after Hopwood.  For 
more on that effect, see supra note 88. 
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public contracting.”244  This proposition went into effect in 1997,245 and by 
comparing the enrollment patterns of students from the year before the 
proposition with the patterns from the year after it went into effect, it is 
clear that the new law had an immediate impact on diversity in California’s 
institutions of higher education.  At the undergraduate level for the entire 
University of California system, “920 African-Americans enrolled as 
college freshmen in 1997” and “that number fell to 739 in 1998,” and to 
728 in 2000.246  At the most selective of California’s public universities, 
Berkeley, freshman African American enrollment fell from 252 in 1997 to 
122 in 1998.247  The year that the proposition went into effect, the 
University of California at Berkeley School of Law only enrolled one 
African American student out of a total of 270 students and he was 
accepted a year earlier but had deferred his enrollment.248  In the fall of 
2006, things had not improved much as only thirteen African American 
students enrolled at the law school.249 
Another popular argument against race-based affirmative action 
focuses on the use of ten percent plans as a viable substitute for policies 
that rely heavily on a student’s race.  As mentioned earlier, the state of 
Texas was able to mitigate the effects of the Hopwood decision by 
implementing a ten percent plan which granted high school seniors 
graduating in the top ten percent of their class automatic admission to their 
choice of state university and the University of Texas.250  This plan had 
some initial success in increasing minority enrollment after a sharp drop 
off due to the Hopwood ruling.251  But, like income-based affirmative 
action, this program also proved to be an insufficient alternative to race-
based affirmative action.  In a study released in 2003, Princeton University 
sociologist Marta Tienda found that graduates in the top ten percent of 
their class in Texas high schools were admitted with “near certainty” to 
Texas public universities before Hopwood and before the ten percent plan 
was created.252  Therefore, the state’s new ten percent plan did not assist 
students in the second and third deciles of their high school classes and the 
elimination of race-based affirmative action proved to be a huge detriment 
                                                                                                                          
244 Jennifer M. Chacón, Race as a Diagnostic Tool: Latinas/os and Higher Education in 
California, Post-209, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (2008) (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)). 
245 Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1139, 
1139 n.1 (2008). 
246 Greenberg, supra note 193, at 543. 
247 Id. (citation omitted). 
248 Id. at 544 (citation omitted). 
249 Michelle Locke, Blacks, Hispanics Rebound from Death of Preferences; Enrollment Back Up- 
With a Catch, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 7, 2007, at 36. 
250 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
251 Id. 
252 Press Release, Princeton University, Study: Texas ‘10 Percent Plan’ Fails to Sustain Diversity 
at Flagship Universities (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/pr/news/03/q1/0123-
tienda.htm. 
 730 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:693 
to these students seeking admission to the state’s flagship universities.253  
Tienda found that after Hopwood, the admission probability of students 
ranked in the second decile of their senior class fell from 85.3% to 71.7% 
for African Americans and from 86.9% to 75.9% for Hispanics at Texas 
A&M.254  At the University of Texas at Austin, there was a drop in 
admission probability from 78.7% to 73.8% for African Americans and 
from 81.8% to 79.5% for Hispanics.255  During this same period, the 
admission probability of similarly ranked white students rose from 80.2% 
to 83.9% at Texas A&M.256  At the University of Texas at Austin, the 
admission probability of white students ranked in the 80th to 89th 
percentile of their class increased from 80.4% to 91.1% post-Hopwood.257  
The University of Texas at Austin saw these declines in minority 
enrollment despite combining the ten percent plan with an aggressive 
outreach plan, named the UT Longhorn Scholars program, “which 
recruited students from high schools with relatively large economically 
disadvantaged and minority student bodies.”258 
In a study looking at the percentage plan in Texas along with plans in 
California and Florida, research found that the plans in those states had 
“the least impact on the most competitive campuses, which [had] persisting 
losses in spite of many levels of efforts to make up for affirmative 
action.”259  The study also found that the plans only “serve as a kind of 
shorthand for what university officials know are actually systems of openly 
or loosely veiled race-attentive outreach, recruitment, support programs, 
and financial aid that enhance the likelihood of application, admission, and 
enrollment for some students,”260 and without such supports, “the plans are 
more like empty shells, appearing to promise eligibility, admission, and 
enrollment for previously excluded groups but actually doing very 
little.”261 
As the 2004 DOE report referenced in Part IV indicates, there are 
many alternatives to race-based affirmative action programs.262  While this 
is not the proper forum to discuss the success rates of each of those 
alternatives, it is clear that two of the more popular alternatives, income-
based affirmative action and percentage plans, which have been utilized by 
states with very successful public university systems, Texas, California, 
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and Florida, are not adequate replacements for race-based affirmative 
action programs.  Therefore, at this point in time, race-based affirmative 
action programs are needed to ensure diverse student bodies in higher 
education. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the holding of Parents Involved will have a 
subtle, yet possibly significant effect on how college and university 
admissions departments use and develop race-based affirmative action 
policies.  Although Grutter is still good law, the additional requirements 
suggested by the Parents Involved Court are not in conflict with the 2003 
affirmative action cases.  Therefore, while the Supreme Court has not 
adopted these requirements into the higher education setting, it is likely 
that, should a case come before the Court in the future, it will look to both 
Grutter and Parents Involved for guidance.  In order to preempt a 
challenge to its affirmative action policies, admissions departments should 
structure their admissions criteria to the guidelines set by the Court in 
Grutter and Parents Involved. 
The college admissions process should determine “which set of 
applicants, considered individually and collectively, will take fullest 
advantage of what the college has to offer, contribute most to the 
educational process in college, and be most successful in using what they 
have learned for the benefit of the larger society.”263  This goal of the 
admissions process is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of 
diversity as a compelling governmental interest in higher education and the 
educational and developmental benefits of learning in a diverse 
environment.  As a result, even if colleges and universities were to follow 
the requirements subtly mandated by Parents Involved, the current law on 
the use of affirmative action still allows for the admission of students who 
will “contribute most to the educational process in college . . . .”264  Since 
this optimal level has been achieved, the courts should refrain from 
implementing any further restrictions or requirements on the use of 
affirmative action by colleges and universities. 
Perhaps Justice O’Connor was correct in her assertion that the need to 
consider an applicant’s race in the admissions process can be eliminated 
within the next couple of decades.  However, it is clear that such a society 
does not currently exist.265  Until it is evident that students of all 
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backgrounds are on an “equal playing field,” in the best interests of justice 
and public policy, Justice O’Connor’s deadline must be ignored and the 
law toward affirmative action must maintain its current shape. 
                                                                                                                          
leadership and decision-making roles in our institutions of higher education, 
business and industry, and government. 
2) When the voices and views of minorities and women are actively solicited, 
present, heard and accorded due respect and weight in the processes of hiring, 
promotion, merit and retention in higher education, business and industry, and 
government. 
3) When policies, practices, attitudes and structures within our institutions, 
organizations and workplaces support the development and success of qualified 
minorities and women to the same extent that others are developed and supported. 
4) When the cultural, social and interactional environments of our social 
institutions and places of work, play and education are welcoming, supportive and 
affirming of diverse “ways of thinking, being and doing.” 
5) When the inclusion, representation and participation of minorities and women 
are not afterthoughts or add-ons, but up-front and expected considerations as 
processes, activities and events are planned, designed and developed. 
6) When diversity “enriches” more than it “enrages.” 
7) When diversity unites more than it divides. 
8) When diversity is perceived and treated as an asset instead of a deficit. 
9) When race and gender, as well as other statuses and characteristics, don’t 
matter. 
10) When minorities and women no longer have to work twice as hard to be 
perceived as being “half-as-good.” 
Jose J. Soto, United States is Not Ready for End of Affirmative Action, LINCOLN J. STAR, Apr. 21, 
2008, at B4. 
